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Abstract: At the end of the nineteenth century the northern port of Liverpool had become the second 
largest in the United Kingdom. Fast transatlantic steamers to Boston and other American ports 
exploited this route, increasing the risk of maritime disease epidemics. The 1901-1903 epidemic in 
Liverpool was the last serious smallpox outbreak in Liverpool and was probably seeded from these 
maritime contacts, which introduced a milder form of the disease that was more difficult to trace 
because of its long incubation period and occurrence of undiagnosed cases. The characteristics of 
these epidemics in Boston and Liverpool are described and compared with outbreaks in New York, 
Glasgow and London between 1900 and 1903. Public health control strategies, notably medical 
inspection, quarantine and vaccination differed between the two countries and in both settings, were 
inconsistently applied, often for commercial reasons or public unpopularity. As a result, smaller 
smallpox epidemics spread out from Liverpool until 1905. This paper analyses factors that 
contributed to this last serious epidemic using the historical epidemiological data available at that 
time. Though imperfect, these early public health strategies paved the way for better prevention of 
imported maritime diseases.  
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Introduction 
        A constellation of factors contributed to the pattern of smallpox outbreaks in the United States 
and United Kingdom at the onset of the twentieth century. This dreadful disease had occurred in 
sequential epidemics throughout the nineteenth century in British cities 1, and was largely imported 
from Europe.2  In contrast in the United States, with the exception of mild smallpox in the southern 
States and a few severe cases in the city of New York, the disease had, by 1897, entirely disappeared 
from the country.3 This changed in late 1896, following an outbreak of a very mild type of smallpox 
which originated in the southern States and spread over four years to north-eastern cities and ports. 
Historical epidemiology suggests importation of smallpox from these ports to the United Kingdom, 
and particularly to Liverpool from Boston in 1901. The barrier of the Atlantic Ocean was now 
bridged by fast transatlantic steamers, shortening crossing times to less than six days 4, heightening 
commercial shipping interests while allowing rapid dissemination from infected sailors. The 
Liverpool Dock System between 1890 and 1906 was radically reconstructed allowing intake of a 
greater number of larger ships from America.5 The city expanded to become the second largest port 
in the United Kingdom at the turn of the century. 
 
      This paper describes the factors that contributed to the pattern of national smallpox outbreaks in 
the United States and United Kingdom and specifically in the cities of New York, Boston and 
Liverpool between 1901 and 1903. Re-constructing these historical epidemics using imperfect 
sources is challenging and methodological limitations are considered. The primary aim is to describe 
public health approaches to control smallpox during epidemics in major transit ports for Atlantic 
shipping and factors which influenced these efforts. Experience with different responses helped 
develop a more evidence-based approach to disease control and to anticipate the general public’s 
response to such measures.  A knowledge base for disease control was growing, given experience 
with other maritime imported epidemic diseases such as cholera and plague, but smallpox differed 
due to the availability of an effective preventive vaccine, the efficacy of which had not been fully 
assessed. In analysing these data, a secondary aim is to examine the evidence that smallpox cases 
occurring in Liverpool in 1901 and 1902 may have originated from American imported cases. Peak 
smallpox incidence in the United States spanned the period 1901 and 1902 and a high infection risk 
was channelled via ships travelling from Boston to Liverpool, where the outbreak peaked in April 
 
 
1.  Charles Creighton. A History of Epidemics in Britain, Volume Two 1666-1893 (Frank Kass and Co. Ltd., 
London, 1965, First edition 1894), 582-601 and 604-619. 
2.  Donald R. Hopkins. Princes and Peasants, Smallpox in History (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1983), 87 -96. 
3.  Charles Value Chapin. Variation in type of infectious disease as shown by the history of smallpox in the 
United States 1895 – 1912. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 13, (1913), 171-196. 
4.  P. J. Hugill. World Trade since 1431 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 128. 
5.  William Farrer and J. Brownbill (eds), in A History of the County of Lancaster, Volume 4, (London, 1911, 
British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/vch/lancs), 41-43. 
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1903. Outbreaks across northern and central England were temporally related to the Liverpool 
epidemic.    
 
      The response to the epidemics was influenced by new epidemiological approaches and public 
health practices in both countries, although public health recommendations differed. In the United 
States, National and State vaccination strategies varied, as well as exemption regulations for children 
and adults. In both countries, commercial interests, variable clinical disease patterns, delayed 
diagnosis, and quarantine practices were influenced by local factors. An improved understanding of 
smallpox disease epidemiology slowly emerged and contributed to eventual control and elimination 
through broadened international efforts.  
 
1. Methodological approaches to re-constructing historical epidemiological evidence 
       
            Extracting and interpreting late nineteenth century information from historical medical records 
on smallpox in order to quantify risk factors, a standard method in modern disease epidemiology, is 
subject to several pitfalls. Instead of meticulous tracing and recording of known cases and their 
contacts, the basic assumption at that time attributed the social and domestic habits of the poor to be 
the principal factors spreading smallpox.6 Emphasis on environmental and aggregate models of 
health and disease suggested that micro-organisms causing a specific disease were subordinate to the 
person’s total environment.7 It is true that environmental conditions are important, but by the late 
nineteenth century it was also realised that epidemics were caused by a specific agent. Although the 
organism responsible for smallpox had not been isolated, it caused a recognised disease, which 
evoked introduction of tighter measures to prevent its importation. This included inspecting ships, 
monitoring smallpox outbreaks at home and abroad and some level of contact tracing.8   Europe-wide 
pandemics from 1870 to 1875 had led to improved vaccination strategies with legal provisions for 
enforcement. These developments, the basis of modern preventive epidemiology, occurred despite 
inadequate understanding of the causal agent, its modes of transmission, or the relative impact of 
behavioural changes and social determinants.9 
          Despite such progress, the present re-construction of historical outbreaks and examination of 
their risk factors is affected by several criteria which are difficult to quantify. These included:    
variable definitions of reported events; misdiagnoses; lack of detailed household transmission data; 
spatial heterogeneities; inadequate information on vaccine effectiveness - partly because of 
 
        6.  Anne Hardy. The Epidemic Streets. Infectious Disease and the Rise of Preventive Medicine 1856-1900 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), 134 and 145. 
7.  Charles E Rosenberg. Explaining epidemics and other studies in the history of medicine (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 299-301. 
8.  Alexander Mercer. Infections, Chronic Disease, and the Epidemiological Transition: A New Perspective 
(Rochester, NY, University of Rochester Press, 2014), 69. 
9.  Del Valle S, Hethcote H, Hyman JM, Castillo-Chavez C. Effects of behavioural changes in a smallpox 
attack model. Mathematical Biosciences.195, (2005), (2):228-51. 
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  lack of reliable estimation methods; difficulties in early recognition of smallpox cases and confusion 
with chicken pox or measles; notification delayed until the afflicted person had been suffering for 
many days and the absence of explicit statistical analyses. 10, 11 Since the length of the incubation 
period can only be known for individuals exposed early, late reporting compromised quarantine 
regulations which specified a period of 14 to 16 days. In practice it was based on clinical experience 
and limited epidemiological data. Similarly, vaccine coverage of the general, or sub-groups of the 
population was critical, in order to reach a target capable of interrupting an epidemic. In the modern 
era estimates of critical vaccine coverage are obtained by estimating the ‘reproduction number’ 
which is based on the average number of secondary cases which arise from a single index case in a 
susceptible population in the absence of interventions. During the early twentieth century lack of 
reliable statistical methods precluded measurement of vaccine effectiveness and, as a consequence, 
use of smallpox vaccine remained controversial. In this paper, vaccine efficacy is calculated from the 
data available, both in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Boston Health Department 
physician, Dr Frank Morse, pointed out in 1903 that accurate smallpox records had been kept only 
since 1888, and were reported in the Annual Reports of the City Health Department Surgeon, as well 
as the Annual Reports of the Surgeon General of the Public Health, and Marine-Hospital Service of 
the United States. Nevertheless this information provided no data on how many people were 
vaccinated or re-vaccinated out of the total population.12 In the United Kingdom case numbers and 
locations were listed in the Annual Reports of City Medical Officers of Health, and the Metropolitan 
Asylums Board, and these provided crude estimates of vaccinated and allegedly vaccinated 
individuals, although criteria for identifying vaccine scars were unclear. Part of the analysis in this 
paper uses information based on these reports for the years 1901 to 1905. Monthly case notifications 
are available in both the United States and United Kingdom, but seasonal analysis of case fatality is 
limited as available reports provide mostly annual data on deaths. The availability of these data also 
enables the hypothesis to be evaluated that the Liverpool outbreaks originated in the United States 
where disease control measures differed and may have been less efficient. 
 
             
2. Maritime relationships between Britain and the United States 
Early twentieth century maritime quarantine regulations at British and United States seaports 
      In the late nineteenth century quarantine stations and regulations for the sanitary inspection of 
ships were present at many British seaports and general sanitary arrangements were satisfactory 
 
 
10. Hiroshi Nishiura, Stefan O. Brockmann, Martin Eichner. Extracting key information from historical data to 
quantify the transmission dynamics of smallpox. Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling, 5, (2008), 
20. doi: 10.1186/1742-4682-5-20. 
11. Karen Wallach. The Antivaccine Heresy: Jacobson v. Massachusetts and the Troubled History of 
Compulsory Vaccination in the United States. Rochester Studies in Medical history, (Boydell and Brewer, 
University of Rochester Press, 2015), 70-73, 253. Provides an extensive list of references covering the 
period 1900 to 1902 on difficulties of smallpox diagnosis in the United States. 
12. Ibid., 16. 
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in two-thirds of the sixty port sanitary districts.13 Similar arrangements were present on the Atlantic 
seaboard of the United States.14 Several diseases were cause for concern, including cholera, plague, 
yellow fever and smallpox.15 Sanitary inspection of all vessels entering British or United States ports 
was the main strategy available. The UK Public Health (Shipping) Act of 1885 extended the ordinary 
powers of local authorities granted in the 1872 Public Health Act to the Port Sanitary Authorities in 
respect of infectious disease.16 These initiatives allowed efficient intervention when vessels with 
infected crew or passengers entered ports.17 To this end, smallpox figures for countries from which 
other ships originated were included in reports in both countries, 18, 19 and could be used to enhance 
surveillance.  
 
      There was some collaboration between the two countries. The United States Assistant Surgeon, 
Dr Carroll Fox (b.1874) stayed in the Liverpool United States Consulate for three months in 1902 to 
review infection control policy and practice and the numbers of smallpox and typhus cases.20 He 
reported on six Liverpool municipal hospitals as well as on containment, refuse disposal and 
disinfection procedures, noting that steam disinfectors used in Liverpool were newer than those used 
by the Public Health Service at the quarantine station in Port Townsend, Washington. This exchange 
signalled some of the first international efforts to harmonise infection control practice across major 
sea routes for maritime transport. Yet, in September 1902, as Dr Fox completed his mission, eleven 
ships with infected seamen from Boston had already arrived, although Dr Fox failed to mention the 
Boston epidemic in his report.  
 
             In the last decade of the nineteenth century the twin systems of medical inspection and quarantine 
were in use, but with greater emphasis on medical inspection and case isolation.  The risk posed 
        by foreigners had become more evident to the general public in the United States as migration  
 
 
13. Anne Hardy. Smallpox in London: factors in the decline of the disease in the nineteenth century. Medical 
History, 27, (1983), 128. 
14. Howard Markel. A gate to the City: The Baltimore Quarantine Station, 1918-28, Public Health Reports, 
110, 2 (1995), 218-219. 
15. D. S. Barnes. Cargo, ‘Infection,’ and the logic of quarantine in the nineteenth century, Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine, 88, (2014), 75-101. 
16. Public Health (Shipping) Act (1885), 48 & 49, and Public Health Act (1872), 75 & 76 Vict. c. 79, sec. 3, 
20. 
17. J. C .Burne. The Long Reach Hospital Ships and Miss Willis. Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, 66, (1973), 1017-1021. 
18. Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service 
of the United States, Fiscal year 1902 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1903), 303-3. 
19. Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service of the United 
States, Fiscal year 1904 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1905), 100. 
20. Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service  of the United 
States, Fiscal year 1903 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904), 192-193. He later won 
recognition for the identification of a quirk in the flea population of San Francisco, California, and helped 
prevent a wider outbreak of plague which had been infecting the city population since 1900. Public Health 
Reports, September 25, 1908, quoted in David K.Randall. Black Death at the Golden Gate. The race to 
save America from the bubonic plague. (W.W.Norton and Company NewYork 2019), 210-211.  
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sensitised opinions, and foreigners became a focus for quarantine policies.21, 22  In the United 
Kingdom the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 required  medical inspection of all outward bound 
steerage passengers and crew, when services of a medical practitioner could be obtained, on board 
ship or preferably before embarkation.23 In the Port of London, Gravesend, the Medical Officer for 
the Board of Trade commonly examined all persons as they proceeded along the gangway and 
refused them permission to proceed, if considered ill.24 This screening had low sensitivity, but should 
have identified obviously sick travellers with facial rashes which might be a sign of active infection. 
As an alternative to inspection, the argument for quarantine of ships was contentious. A Lancet 
editorial commented in 1880 that it only survived because it was plausible, seductive, and fitted the 
unreasonable demands of certain continental powers, and that ‘it was derogatory to England that she 
should submit to these  hideously farcical detrimental proceedings’.25 Quarantine avoided the trouble 
of disinfecting and removing the sick, but was costly for trading sea ports. Moreover unless cholera, 
plague, or yellow fever was existent on board a vessel there was no legal authority for detaining her 
on sanitary grounds. Some had advocated the inclusion of smallpox in the cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever order; but a smallpox reservoir in the United Kingdom was assumed so its inclusion was 
considered inadvisable as it would deter international trade.   
    
Quarantine stations 
      In Britain quarantine stations, including some more isolated off-shore establishments, had existed 
in the early nineteenth century. This remained the only effective measure until later in the century 
when contact tracing and surveillance were introduced. Port Sanitary Authorities established hospital 
ships in a number of locations around Britain to isolate suspected smallpox cases. In 1884 the 
Metropolitan Asylums Board moored three converted ships in the Thames to serve as a floating 
hospital, 26 primarily for indigenous cases arising during the 1884 -1885 London smallpox 
epidemic.27 By 1899 the Infectious Diseases Notification Act required compulsory notification of 
infections, by which time, smallpox was the focus of attention.28   In Liverpool in 1874 the Local 
Government Board, under the Public Health Act, permanently constituted the Liverpool Council with 
powers to inspect vessels on arrival and to appoint a quarantine station in the river Mersey where 
vessels could anchor. A quarantine station already existed at Hoyle Lake, an offshore area enclosed 
by sandbanks on the outer Mersey estuary, which provided accommodation for infected patients, 
 
21. Barnes, op.cit. (note 15). 
22. Alan M. Kraut. Silent Travelers: germs, genes, and the "immigrant menace". (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), 50-77. 
23. Port of London Sanitary Committee. Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health to 31 December 
1902. May 1903, 23 -25. 
24. Ibid., Appendix H, 77-91. 
25. The Lancet, editorial, 1, (1880), 687-689. 
26. Burne, op.cit. (note 17). 
27. London Metropolitan Asylums Board Annual Report 1900 (M. Corquadale and Co. Ltd., London 1901). 
28. Infectious Diseases Notification Act (1899), 62 & 63 Vict. c. 8. 
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particularly cholera cases.29 As the estuary was silting up and Liverpool port expanded, a land-based 
Port Sanitary isolation hospital was built in 1875 at New Ferry, isolated from the public, and with 
ship access via a long wooden jetty.30  
 
        Procedures were in place for ship fumigation, cleaning and painting of vessels, disinfection of 
clothing, and vaccination of passengers and seamen, although often seamen refused vaccination.31, 32 
This task was immense, given the number of ships passing through the Port of Liverpool. Over 1,200 
cases of tropical diseases were admitted to the Port Sanitary Hospital in the period 1875 - 1963, 
including cholera, leprosy and smallpox. Some infectious diseases were still treated as ordinary 
patients in other Liverpool hospitals, including smallpox cases, which were later transferred to New 
Ferry.33 As early as 1891 New Ferry was declared unnecessary. Instead, long haul ships proceeded 
directly to the Pier Head entrance of each Liverpool dock to answer questions on quarantine, a 
concession much appreciated by ship owners.34 In 1896 quarantine was discontinued and officially 
replaced by medical inspection, 35 although in practice quarantine remained, but at the discretion of 
the Local Government Board, rather than a national policy.36  New Ferry simply acted as an isolation 
hospital for eighty-eight years and was officially burned down in 1963. A commemorative plaque 
records its historic role and location and is the last physical reminder of a Port Sanitary hospital in the 
United Kingdom (Figure 1). Even today, quarantine is exerted only in exceptional circumstances. 
 
[Place figure 1 near to here] 
 
      In the United States maritime quarantine was initially a State activity but was transferred to a 
national Public Health Service between the 1880s and the 1920s. The Marine Hospital, dedicated to 
the care of ill and disabled seamen in the United States Merchant Marines, the US Coast Guard 
and other federal beneficiaries, eventually evolved into the Public Health Service Commissioned 
 
 
29. Thomas Herbert Bickerton. Medical History of Liverpool from the Earliest Days to the Year 1920 
(London: John Murray, 1936), 188. 
30. Port Sanitary Hospital, New Ferry, City of Liverpool Smallpox Register, Wirral Archives, Cheshire Lines 
Building Centre, Birkenhead, Wirral. 
31. Hardy, op.cit. (note 13), 122-123,129. 
32. William Hanna. Report on Marine Hygiene. Being suggestions for improvements in the sanitary 
arrangements and appliances on shipboard. Liverpool Port Sanitary Authority (C. Tinling and Co. Ltd., 
1917). 
33. Liverpool and Emigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. National Museums Liverpool, 
Maritime Archives and Library, Information Sheet 64. 
34. John Booker. Maritime Quarantine. The British Expansion, 1650-1900 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,   
Hampshire, England, 2007), 547. 
35. The Public Health Act 1896 (Statute 59 and 60, c19) made provisions with respect to epidemic, endemic 
and infectious diseases and repealed the 1825 Quarantine Act (Statute 6 Geo iv, c78), and sections in other 
acts in which quarantine was mentioned. The Act united for the first time the sanitary arrangements of the 
United Kingdom. 
36. Booker, op cit. (note 34), 549-550. 
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Corps.37 Quarantine stations were established 38, and a prescribed protocol followed, based on the 
vessel’s sanitary history and presence of infected or deceased crew or passengers. Disease detection 
led to active disinfection and fumigation of ships and isolation of passengers. When a case of 
smallpox was detected, crew and passengers were expected to spend 14 days in quarantine when a 
case of smallpox was diagnosed on board, although breaches of recommended policies were often 
made, especially for travellers in first and second class.39  
          
       
3. Factors leading up to the Boston 1901-1902 smallpox epidemic in the United States 
 
      Smallpox, when recognised, was reported and case fatalities were recorded across the country. Dr 
Charles Value Chapin (1856-1941), an American pioneer in public health research and practice, and 
Health Superintendent (1884-1932) for Providence, Rhode Island, compiled a detailed outline of 
smallpox in the United States between 1895 and 1912.40 By 1897, with the exception of mild 
smallpox in the south and a few severe cases in New York City, the disease had disappeared from the 
country. During 1896 cases of mild disease in Florida began to spread and within a period of about 
four years cases were detected all over the country.41 The rate of dispersion was exponential as the 
infection was mild, which meant patients remained active in their community and cases were under-
reported.42 By 1900 this wave of infection reached north-eastern cities and by 1901 had carried 
smallpox to every state and territory in the Union. There had been an epidemic in New York City in 
late 1899, preceding that in Boston in 1901.43, 44 The main culprit was the milder strain (Variola 
minor), with had a death rate of two to six per cent among unvaccinated individuals, which was 
considerably lower than with the Variola Major strain. 45 Variola major nonetheless remained 
present in several American cities, particularly in the North-East.  
 
      Disease notification was incomplete in some cities and rural areas and some states omitted 
returns.46 Using National Population Census data of 1900, and the Annual Report of state smallpox 
notifications of the Surgeon General of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service for 
 
 
37. United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service Annual Report, 1905, 221. 
38. Markel, op.cit. (note 14). 
39. Michael Willrich. Pox. An American History (The Pengion Press, New York, 2011), 219. 
40. Chapin, op.cit. (note 3),186. 
41. Hopkins, op.cit. (note 2), 288. 
42. Gareth Williams. Angel of Death. The Story of Smallpox (Palgrave, Macmillan, Hampshire, 2010), 331-
332. 
43. Chapin, op.cit. (note 3),186. 
44. Willrich, op cit. (note 39), 41-74, 167. 
45. Thirty-First Annual Report of the Health Department of the City of Boston for the Year 1902 (City of   
Boston Printing Department.1903), 36. 
46. Ibid., 172. 
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1901 47, 48 incidence for individual states returning notifications can be estimated. Figure 2 shows 
these estimates by state between 28 June 1901 and 27 July 1902 per 100,000 population. By 1901, as 
the epidemic spread north, incidence rapidly declined in southern states, ranging from less than one 
per 105 population in Texas, to above 300 cases per 105 population in North Dakota, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. Annual smallpox notifications peaked nationally in 1901 at 56,857 cases (Figure 2). In 
Massachusetts, where the 1901 Boston epidemic occurred, annual incidence for that year was sixty 
per 105 population. In New York City, between 1901 and 1902, 3,480 smallpox cases were reported 
with 720 deaths (incidence approximately 100 cases per 100,000 population).49  
 
[Place figure 2 near to here]  
   
           The Boston epidemic commenced in May 1901 in a large factory.50 Cases were initially mild but 
by May 1901 severe cases began to appear. Their source was not known. The Health Department 
thought a letter received by a family from infected relatives living through the New York epidemic, 
was the cause.51 In the outbreak, twelve cases within forty-eight hours were admitted to hospital, and 
despite control measures, cases increased to thirty in September, forty-nine in October, 195 in 
November, and 201 in December 1901.52 By the end of October 1902 new cases of smallpox had 
appeared in nearly every section of the city with the epidemic continuing to 1903. In total there were 
1596 cases (period incidence 284 per 100,000 population) with 270 deaths (17 per cent).43, 53 A 
smaller concurrent smallpox epidemic occurred in the adjoining city of Cambridge, Boston’s close 
neighbour across the Charles river.54 The nationally prominent senior public health officer in Boston, 
and Health Department Chairman, Dr Samuel Holmes Durgin (1839-1931), initially played down the 
epidemic, referring to it as only ‘a flurry of cases’ and a minor storm that would pass.55 Durgin 
advised that schools should remain open and insisted that immediate vaccination rather than 
quarantine was the most effective control strategy. Many leading physicians in Boston preferred 
vaccination to sanitation and quarantine, and were somewhat indifferent to public anxiety over 
contagion 56 Durgin was blamed for the continued spread of smallpox, not least because he had  
 
47. United States National Census 1900. 12th Census population. United States Federal Census Records, 
Census records.com. 
48. Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service of the United 
States, Fiscal year 1901 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1902), 319-344, 579-582. 
49. John Christie McVail. Half a century of smallpox and vaccination. Milroy Lectures, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh, E. & S. Livingstone, 1919), 10. 
50. Thirtieth Annual Report of the Health Department of the City of Boston for the Year 1901 (Boston, City of 
Boston Printing Department, 1902), 43. 
51. Chapin, op.cit. (note 3),186. 
52. Thirtieth Boston Annual Health Department Report, op.cit. (note 50), 44. 
53. Michael Albert, Kristen Ostheimer, Joel Breman. The last smallpox epidemic in Boston and the 
vaccination controversy, 1901 -1903. New England Journal of Medicine, 344, 5 (2001), 375 -378. 
54. Wallach, op.cit. (note 11), chapter three, The 1901-2 smallpox epidemic in Boston and Cambridge, 75-78 
55. Ibid., 59. 
56. Ibid., 68-69. 
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allowed the Health Department physicians who treated smallpox patients to mingle and expose the  
public without taking precautions.57   The cost of quarantine weighed heavily on officials and the 
controversy received front page press coverage.58  
  
      The difference in severity of cases between epidemics warrants further examination. 
Characteristics of this epidemic can be gleaned from the clinical records of 243 patients 
consecutively admitted to the Southampton Street smallpox hospital in Boston.59 Some hospital cases 
were caused by the Variola major form of smallpox, but these were not necessarily representative as 
many attacks were mild.60     Smallpox has an incubation period of approximately seven to seventeen 
days, clinical onset leading to headache and backache, fever and malaise during a three day pre-
eruptive period before appearance of a skin rash. Hospital cases presented with varying severity, but 
forty-seven per cent were the milder form of the disease, and most occurred in previously vaccinated 
persons. Full recovery took weeks with most deaths occurring as a result of unrecognised cases of 
smallpox in the city and suburban districts going about from place to place, with many unvaccinated 
people being exposed to infection.61 In the initial febrile phase (two to four days) individuals would 
be infective, but infected seafarers, or their contacts, may not have developed symptoms until nearly 
three weeks later. Individuals incubating the disease could readily depart on transatlantic ships and 
act as disease vectors.62 
 
        The Boston epidemic coincided with a smaller smallpox epidemic (after accounting for the 
difference in population size) in London, commencing in June 1901 and lasting until January 1903, 
with 9484 notified cases.63  There is no evidence that the London and Boston outbreaks were 
connected, despite their similar timing of onset. The daily surveillance returns to the Metropolitan 
Health Board for the 1901-1903 London epidemic indicated upwards of twenty different centres of 
infection. The origin of the disease for the first two patients could not be traced and, so far as was 
known, no cases arose from contact with them. Two foci at the end of June identified a Parisian male 
who infected four people, including a laundry worker who infected nine other contacts.64 In August 
several other cases, whose contact source could be traced, seemed unconnected. Preceding both these 
epidemics was an outbreak in Glasgow, which began in April 1900 and lasted until July 1901 
 
 
57. Ibid., 152-153. 
58. Cambridge Chronicle, Three strong letters against quarantine, The Board of Health’s opinion. Dr 
Brough’s opinion, July 19, 1. 
59. Michael R. Albert, Kristen G. Ostheimer, David J. Liewehr, Seth M. Steinberg, Joel G. Breman. Smallpox 
manifestations during the Boston epidemic of 1901-1903. Annals of Internal Medicine, 137, 12 (2002), 
993-1000. 
60. Wallach, op.cit. (note 11), 69. 
61. Thirty-first Boston Annual Health Department Report, op.cit. (note 45), 36.  
62. Albert, op.cit. (note 59), 375. 
63. Metropolitan Asylums Board Annual Report 1901, Sixteenth Report of the Statistical Committee. 
       (London: McCorquadale & Co. Ltd., 1902). 
64. Ibid., 108. 
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(1786 notified cases), with a recrudescent period between January and May 1902 (469 notified 
cases).65 The Glasgow epidemic terminated prior to the onset of the Boston epidemic and the two are 
unlikely to have been directly related. A small epidemic occurred in Dublin in 1903 with less than 
250 cases and under 40 deaths, 66 which resulted from indigenous transmission with an index case 
from Glasgow. Vessels from Boston did not sail via Dublin (see Figure 4 below).  
 
 
4. Transatlantic sailings transmitting smallpox from the Eastern United States to Liverpool 
      In the nineteenth century thousands of emigrants from the British Isles left from Liverpool Port. 
Packet lines sailed regularly from 1818, and in 1822 smallpox was transmitted from Liverpool to 
Baltimore on board the ship Pallas.67 Demand for North American timber and cotton to meet British 
industrial expansion led to well established transatlantic links. British manufactured products 
provided a useful return cargo. Steamships started to replace sail after the 1860s and average voyage 
time was reduced to as little as six days.68 The city of Liverpool was largely dependent upon the sea 
for its commercial prosperity. Several steamship lines at the turn of the century were competing for 
transatlantic passengers to Boston from Liverpool, and American cattle ships departing from Boston 
traded regularly with the City.69 Schedules of ships arriving in Liverpool from Boston for different 
steamship companies resulted in multiple arrivals each week, and round trip transits took less than a 
month. In 1902 tonnage entering and leaving the river Mersey amounted to the colossal total of 
29,000,000 tons, with 214,000 emigrants.70 
 
      Prior to the 1901-1903 epidemic, smallpox was imported on eight known occasions to Liverpool 
in 1900, the most important being that of the SS New England which arrived with nineteen cases on 
board. This ship left Boston on 1 February, arriving in Liverpool on 30 March. On leaving Boston 
with 525 passengers and 268 crew, including fifty-five clergymen and many elderly people, it 
travelled to the Mediterranean.71 On 11 March, prior to arriving in Constantinople, a male death 
occurred after presenting with petechial skin haemorrhages which were attributed to liver atrophy. 
 
 
65. Archibald Kerr Chalmers. Smallpox, 1900 -1902 (Glasgow: Corporation of Glasgow Report, Printed by 
Robert Anderson, West Nile Street, Glasgow, 1902), 8-10. 
     66. Detailed annual reports of the Registrar- General (Ireland), for 1902 (39th), 1903 (40th), 1904 (41st) 
containing numbers and causes of deaths registered in Ireland for that year (His Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, Dublin, printer Cahill and Co., Dublin, 1903,1904,1905). 
     67. Cyril William Dixon. Smallpox, (London: Churchill Press, 1962), 198. 
68. The Liverpool Post, The American Mails. Performances Outward and Homeward, Cunarders at the front, 
April 11, 1900. 
69. Edward William Hope. Annual Report on the Health of the City of Liverpool during 1901 (Liverpool: 
C.Tinling and Co., Printing Contractors, 1902), 39. 
70. Thomas Clarke. Introductory address to the Section on Port Sanitary Administration, Royal Institute of 
Public Health Congress, Liverpool, July, 1903. Journal of State Medicine, 11, 8 (1903), 454 – 461. 
71. Port of Liverpool, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health to the Port Sanitary Authority for the 
year 1900 (Liverpool: C. Tinling and Co., Printing Contractors, 1901), 16-17. 
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The body was buried at sea. By 21 March twelve other people were sick, including eight crew, two of 
whom were employed in the laundry, and two had been assigned to seal the dead man’s body in a 
casket. By 23 March other passengers were sick with presumed malarial fever and biliousness, and 
some passenger deaths were reported, following visits to Jaffa and Naples. The Captain’s log only 
records smallpox after 22 March, and it is unclear why he sought smallpox vaccine for himself on the 
eleventh while docked in Constantinople. The ship’s doctor had no previous experience of smallpox. 
At Naples all remaining 500 passengers were peremptorily disembarked and given tourist tickets, 
while the vessel left port and sailed for Liverpool without communicating with them on the nature of 
this disease outbreak. The United States Marine Hospital Fortnightly Gazette reported that a number 
of these passengers fell ill with smallpox at Naples and in other places in Italy and France.72 Three 
persons subsequently developed the disease in Liverpool on dates which indicated it was contracted 
prior to disinfection of the ship, which occurred later at Liverpool. On 8 July 1900 the SS Ivernia 
from Boston also landed a single smallpox case at Queenstown while en route to Liverpool.  
 
      Competitive, fast transatlantic passenger and mail steamers were efficient disease vectors. Figure 
3 illustrates three examples of transit involving two ships arriving during the initial phase of the 
Liverpool epidemic.73 These ships left Boston during the period of peak prevalence during the 
epidemic of 1901 -1903.  
 
[Place figure 3 near to here] 
 
Dates in Figure 3 indicate when notified and not when the illness began. The SS Kansas arrived in 
Boston on 15 January following one smallpox death at sea. The ship was quarantined but the vessel 
was allowed to leave for its return trip to Liverpool after only 6 days. When it arrived back in 
Liverpool nine clinical cases were identified on arrival and transferred to the Port Sanitary Hospital at 
New Ferry, one of whom died.74  The crew had been vaccinated before leaving Boston but some were 
already incubating the disease. The Boston Health Department Chairman, Dr Samuel Durgin, 
received criticism in the press for allowing the ship to depart after so few days of quarantine.75 At a 
legislative hearing on an anti-vaccine bill he responded as follows to a critical heckler: ‘I hold the 
public health of Boston in one hand and its commerce in the other.’76 Commercial interests in Boston 
were influential factors affecting public health regulations, at least in this instance. The Health 
Department deliberately gave the outbreak a low profile to prevent an unwanted scare. Press releases 
stated alarm was needless and claimed smallpox has never been epidemic in the city.77  
 
 
72. Ibid., 17. 
73. Edward William Hope, Annual Report on the Health of the City of Liverpool during 1902 (Liverpool: 
C.Tinling and Co., Printing Contractors, 1903), 26-51. 
74. Port Sanitary Hospital, op.cit. (note 30). These men had different occupations, including baker, engineers, 
firemen, carpenter, sailor and boatswain. 
75. The Boston Globe, Eight cases on board, February 7, 1902, 4. 
76. Wallach, op.cit. (note 11), chapter three, The 1901-2 smallpox epidemic in Boston and Cambridge, 61. 
77. The Boston Globe, Alarm was needless. Smallpox has never been epidemic here. Less than two cases in 
every 3000 of the population of Boston, December 15, 1901 
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      The SS Devonian carried infected seamen on separate occasions in early December, January and 
February. With mild type illness the diagnosis was unclear until medical advice on skin spots was 
sought.78 A further maritime case was identified on the SS Campania arriving from New York on 5 
April, on a ship holding the fastest transatlantic crossing time.79 Multiple secondary Liverpool cases 
arose from these infected seamen, especially through local lodging houses and contact with 
workhouse inmates. Seven different ships were carrying infected passengers, and the SS Kansas 
imported nineteen cases from Boston that were admitted to the New Ferry hospital. When the ship 
sailed from Liverpool on 4 January 1902 two crew were treated at sea, one of whom died. Late 
acquisition of smallpox explained these cases. Reaching Boston as many as twenty men were put 
ashore and all cattlemen were taken to the quarantine station and re-vaccinated.80 Returning to 
Liverpool after leaving Boston the SS Kansas put back to New York and landed several further crew 
suffering from smallpox. Later arriving at Liverpool on 6 February nine convalescents and two 
contacts were identified and removed to the Port Sanitary Hospital.81  Most of the crew were re-
vaccinated and some kept under close observation.  
 
[Place figure 4 near to here] 
 
      Figure 4 shows the commercial trade connections of the Port of Liverpool and the multiple 
potential routes for inward transmission of smallpox in 1903 82. Vessels from Liverpool travelling 
west to Boston discharged first at St Johns, Newfoundland, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. On the return 
journey these vessels often travelled directly to Liverpool. Between 1901 -1902 only a single case of 
smallpox was reported in Halifax affecting a seaman on a schooner leaving Gloucester, north of 
Boston. 83 No deaths from smallpox were reported in St Johns during this period, 84 which suggests 
westward transmission of smallpox from Liverpool was negligible. The number of maritime cases of 
smallpox landed from vessels in the Port of Liverpool between 1900 and 1904 is shown in Table I in 
relation to port origin and case fatality. The total number of identified cases arriving from Boston 
represents twenty-seven per cent of all maritime cases. The months involved are shown in detail in 
Figure 5, to illustrate occurrence in Liverpool and steamship arrivals from Boston with diagnosed 
smallpox infected crew or passengers.  Another twenty-seven per cent of importations arrived from  
 
 
78. The Liverpool Echo, Smallpox in Liverpool, a fresh case reported today. Forty-two cases in the City, 
February 17, 1902, 5. 
79. The Liverpool Daily Post, The American Mails, performances outward and homeward. Cunarders to the 
front, April 11, 1900, 3.  
80. Hope, 1903, op.cit. (note 73). 
81. The Liverpool Daily Post, The Smallpox, Liverpool, no fresh cases, infected Cattlemen removed to 
hospital, Saturday, February 8, 1902, 6. 
82. City of Liverpool. Handbook compiled for the Royal Institute of Public Health, Liverpool Congress, 15 -21 
July, 1903, edited by E.W.Hope (Liverpool, Lee and Nightingale, Printers). 
83. Alvey A. Adee. A case of smallpox on schooner Thalia at Halifax. Public Health Reports, 16, (1901), 
2176. 
84. St Johns, Newfoundland. Register of Deaths St Johns City District, Book 3 (1901-1902), 333-339. 
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New York and Baltimore in 1903 and 1904. Other in-coming vessels from outside the United States 
were also responsible for importations of cases or suspected cases of smallpox (Table I), but the 
majority of single country origin were from the United States.  
 
[Place figure 5 near to here] 
  
5. Maritime and non-maritime spread of smallpox in the United Kingdom 1901-1905 
      The connexion between seaports and smallpox had been initially observed in England in the 
epidemic of 1870 -1872, when Liverpool and London were the first places to feel the effects of the 
continental outbreaks associated with the Franco-Prussian war. In Liverpool smallpox had been 
introduced by Spanish sailors.85  Liverpool experienced almost 2000 deaths in the 1871 epidemic, but 
these numbers decreased with 685 deaths during the 1876 -1877 epidemic and 34 deaths in the 
smaller 1881 epidemic.86  
        The 1901 Liverpool outbreak was the last major smallpox epidemic in this city. Its magnitude was 
comparable to earlier 1876 - 1878 outbreaks, as shown in Figure 6. Four Liverpool epidemics had 
[Place figure 6 near to here] 
occurred between 1875 and 1896, which exactly corresponded temporally with the London 
epidemics, spanning both the same years and having identical epidemic periods. This suggests 
indigenous transmission between these cities. In contrast, the Liverpool epidemic of 1901 
commenced twelve months after onset of the London epidemic and was characterised by milder 
infections and close association with imported maritime cases. Yet in London, during 1902, of 
ninety-three smallpox cases treated in their Port Sanitary Hospital, only one was an imported 
infection from New York, admitted on 12 April from the SS Minnehaha.87 Other cases were 
internally transferred to London, mostly from British Ports - particularly Newcastle, with additional 
single importations from Spanish, German, and Dutch ports, as well as India and South Africa.88  
      John Christie McVail (1849-1926), Medical Officer of Health for Stirling and Dumbarton in 
Scotland, and a leading advocate of smallpox vaccination in the early twentieth century, suggested 
that smallpox was no longer indigenous in the United Kingdom and insisted that epidemic outbreaks 
were imported.89   He tabulated provincial smallpox outbreaks in English and Welsh cities and towns 
between 1902 and 1905.90 Incidence estimates per capita can be derived from these case numbers 
using the 1901 United Kingdom National Census. These are listed in Table II, and their spatial 
dispersion mapped in Figure 7. Case fatality estimates are also tabulated for the same locations.  
 
[Place figure 7 near to here] 
85. Hardy, op. cit. (note 13), 128 and 132. 
86. Ibid., 128. 
87. Port of London Sanitary Committee. Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health to 31 December 
1902. May 1903, appendix H, 83. 
88. Ibid., appendix H, pp.77-91.  
89. McVail, op cit., (note 49), 8, 26. 
90. Ibid., p.6 (Table II). 
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       The Liverpool focus is distinct from those in Glasgow, London, Edinburgh, Tynemouth, Hull 
and South Wales, which are all ports, but which did not have regular scheduled transatlantic links 
with Eastern United States seaports. In Southampton only two cases of smallpox were reported on 
vessels bound for the Port in 1902.91 Smallpox outbreak distribution shows temporal dispersion 
across North-West and Central England between the years 1902 and 1904. The dispersion pattern 
implicates Liverpool as the primary focus possibly with discrete sequential transmission across the 
North-West during these years. In these outbreaks, case fatality was low or very low (Table II) and in 
the North-West averaged 6.3%. This mortality was much lower than in the 1901 London epidemic 
(21.6%) suggesting infection was mostly due to a different milder strain, consistent with transmission 
mainly from the Liverpool focus where a mild strain of Variola minor was dominant. Chapin had 
considered it highly probable that the mild type of smallpox was carried to England from Boston in 
1902 and during the following years.92 Case fatality during the epidemic decreased from around 
sixteen per cent in 1901 to eight per cent in 1903.93 As all cases were hospitalised this may have 
caused a bias towards observing severe or fatal cases.94 More than half the national deaths from 
smallpox in 1902 occurred in the north-west of England, either in Lancashire or in the contiguous 
West Riding of Yorkshire. In both cases, about four-fifths of the mortality took place in the course of 
the first half of the year with the majority of deaths in the city of Liverpool.95  
 
      The first infected Liverpool resident was identified on 12 December 1901 (Figure 3), from a 
lodging house ‘infected’ by an imported maritime case.96  Between December 1901 and November 
1902 there were three minor epidemics, followed by a major epidemic between December 1902 and 
December 1903. The minor epidemics corresponded temporally to the period of initial importation of 
Boston cases (Figure 3). The onset of the ensuing major epidemic corresponded with the second peak 
in prevalence in Boston. Indigenous Liverpool cases who had some direct or indirect contact with 
Boston seamen can be identified up until January 1903. Between October 1902 and December 1903, 
108 households reported cases which accommodated sailors or mariners.97 Imported cases from other 
East coast American ports were recorded in 1903 (Table I). Smallpox was circulating in other British 
 
  
91. Southampton 1902 Public Health Report, 26. 
92. Chapin, op cit., (note 3). 
93. Annual Reports on the Health of the City of Liverpool during 1900 to 1904. (C. Tinling and Co., Printing 
Contractors, Liverpool 1901). Estimates compiled from figures available from Annual Health Reports 
produced by Dr EW Hope, Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool, for the years 1900 to 1904, and 
published in the years 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, and 1905. 
94. Martin Eichner. Analysis of historical data suggests long-lasting protective effects of smallpox 
vaccination. American Journal of Epidemiology, 158, (2003), 717-723. 
95. Sixty-sixth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England and 
Wales (1903). (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London: Darling and Son, Ltd., 1905), xiviii.  
96. Report by Dr Richard J. Reece to the Local Government Board on smallpox and smallpox hospitals at 
Liverpool, 1902 -1903 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, Darling and Son Ltd., 1905), 10. 
https://search.wellcomelibrary.org/iii/encore/record/CRb2136004. 
97. Edward William Hope, Annual Report on the Health of the City of Liverpool during 1903, (Liverpool: C. 
Tinling and Co., Printing Contractors, 1904), 32. 
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ports, and internal transmission via English coastal shipping cannot be ruled out as these ports did not 
have Port Sanitary Stations and were not subject to the same surveillance as in Liverpool. 
         Figure 8 shows the temporal associations of the New York, Boston, Glasgow, London and 
Liverpool epidemics between 1900 and 1903. Incidence is estimated using population denominators 
from the United States 1900 census and British 1901 census.98, 99 All epidemic periods (time of onset 
to time of resolution) shown in Figure 8 are less than two years. The Liverpool and Boston epidemics 
covered almost identical periods (Liverpool, twenty-four months; Boston, twenty-three months), 
although the shape and distribution of the monthly totals are dissimilar. Peak incidence per 100,000 
population was very similar in Boston and Liverpool. Marked left-sided skewness is evident for the 
Liverpool and Glasgow epidemics, suggesting low early transmission rates. The source of the 
Glasgow outbreak was attributed to severe smallpox in a seaman on board the SS Hispania which 
arrived from Bombay.100 Left-sided skewness was not evident in the London outbreaks in which 
maritime importations were considered less critical. This conclusion is supported by Hardy who has 
commented that for previous London epidemics: 
  ‘In 1881, although smallpox was epidemic in the metropolis, the cases occurring in the port were 
few in number and "quite isolated". There were six imported cases. The smallpox epidemics 
occurring in London in 1876, 1881, and 1884 cannot with certainty be traced to infection from 
abroad: it is possible that the strain introduced in 1870 was working itself out with diminishing 
virulence, and that the port sanitary authorities were successful in preventing its refreshment from 
abroad,’ 101  and: 
    ‘In December 1876 the Port Medical Officer reported that although smallpox was widely epidemic 
in London, it had so far manifested itself in the floating population to an infinitesimal extent.’ 102 
 
[Place figure 8 near to here] 
       The resolution of the Liverpool epidemic was rapid, with a marked fall in incidence in June 
1903, which compares to a much slower resolution in Boston over several months. As described 
below, this may relate to differences between the two cities in the effectiveness of the public health 
response, epidemiological approaches to disease control, as well as the lower vaccine uptake in 
Boston and staggered introductions of vaccine delivery. Case fatality in unvaccinated persons in 
Boston was very similar to that in Liverpool (Table III), whereas fatalities in unvaccinated persons in 
the London and Glasgow epidemics were double that of Boston and Liverpool. It is therefore likely 
this was predominantly a milder illness consistent with a Variola minor strain in Boston and 
Liverpool, whereas the higher case fatality in unvaccinated cases in London and Glasgow is 
consistent with Variola major as the primary source of infection.   
 
98. United States National Census, 1900, op.cit. (note 47). 
99. United Kingdom National Archives, 1901 Census. 
100. Chalmres, op.cit, (note 65), 9. 
101. Hardy, op.cit. (note 13), 132, and Half-Yearly Report of the Medical Officer, (Port of London, June 
1881), 4. 
102. Ibid., p 132, and Half-Yearly Report of the Medical Officer, (Port of London, December 1876), 9. 
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6.  Other factors influencing the course of the Boston and Liverpool epidemics 
Public health measures and quarantine  
      It is now known that smallpox can have a long incubation period (up to 22 days), 103 and a 
relatively low infectious rate without close direct contact, which would cause it to spread slowly 
within or between communities.104 In 1902 the incubation phase was less well defined, and 
containment strategies for asymptomatic contacts who were potentially incubating the disease varied. 
In both Boston and Liverpool emphasis on land was on search and containment. Outbreaks were 
aborted by vaccination around each focus, but contacts were not necessarily placed in quarantine. In 
Boston, houses were kept under observation by medical inspectors for fourteen days with removal of 
secondary cases, but contacts were free to travel, even if they refused vaccination. The absence of 
quarantine led to heated exchanges published in the Cambridge Chronicle, in which the Mayor and 
the state Medical Board doctor recommended quarantine, whereas the Board of Health opposed it.105, 
106 Health authorities is some towns recommended quarantine for immigrants or migrant workers. 
Men living in inexpensive rooming houses were ordered to be vaccinated by the Boston Board of 
Health 107, but it allowed settled inhabitants their freedom. Quarantine was outrageously expensive 
and health departments that relied on vaccination alone justified this as efficiency and fiscal 
responsibility.108  Whether to quarantine or vaccinate thus involved social, economic, and cultural 
considerations. 
 
       In the United Kingdom the Scottish obstetrician Sir James Young Simpson (1811-1870) wrote an 
influential outline on smallpox prevention based on household isolation policies. Its departure point 
was early case notification, quarantine of infected patients, vaccination of carers, hygienic cleaning 
of everything in contact with the patient, and strict disinfection and bedding procedures.109 
Households were to be fumigated by burning sulphur for five hours, stripping and burning wallpaper 
and spraying the interior with mercury perchloride solution, with up to thirty-four houses treated 
daily.110 These practices were regularly followed in Liverpool during the 1901 epidemic but isolation 
of contacts was less straightforward and opinions were divided on whether smallpox was transmitted 
in the prodromal phase of the illness when the patient was febrile, but had no rash – the main 
 
 
103. Nishiura, op cit. (note 10).The ninety-nine per cent upper confidence limit of the incubation period is 22.2 
days suggesting that quarantine should last 23 days. 
104. James A Yorke, Neal Nathanson, Giulo Pianigiani, John Martin. Seasonality and the requirements for 
perpetuation and eradication of viruses in populations, American Journal of Epidemiology, 109,2 (1979), 
103-123. 
105. Wallach, op.cit. (note 11), 152-153. 
106. Cambridge Chronicle, Mayer McNamee scores a point, Cambridge Chronicle, July 12, 1902, 1; Smallpox 
scourge, June 21, 1902; Dr A.W.Bowman takes issue with other physicians and the Board of Health, 
August 9, 1902, 6. 
107. Albert et al, op.cit. (note 59), 375-376. 
108. Wallach, op cit. (note 11), 68-69.  
109. James Simpson. A proposal to stamp out smallpox, Edinburgh: Edmonton and Douglas, 1868. 
110. Reece, op cit., (note 96), 2-3. 
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    indicator for virus transmissibility. Ships with on board crew in a vessel infected with smallpox were 
not routinely quarantined since the Public Health Act of 1896 did not require this, and detention for 
longer than thirty-six hours was considered unreasonable.111 In fact, apparently healthy passengers 
could disembark from their ships without knowing they were transmitters. Cattlemen from Boston 
sometimes sold their return passage tickets, remaining in Liverpool lodging houses, and often in 
particular streets and the poorer districts. 112 This together with misdiagnoses due to the 
uncharacteristic rashes related to milder illness, meant that containment and contact tracing were only 
partially successful. Epidemic proportions of infection first occurred in Liverpool in areas such as 
Everton, having insanitary housing awaiting demolition, many of which were over-crowded, and had 
the highest case fatality.113  Homeless tramps were also blamed for spreading infection in 
Liverpool,114  as were vagrants during the Boston epidemic.115  
   
Views on modes of transmission that affected the public health response 
       In the late nineteenth-century the mode of transmission of smallpox was not well understood. It 
was considered intensely infectious, arising potentially from aerosol spread, infected fomites and 
direct contact with the patient, their clothing or belongings. In industrialised countries it was 
considered a ‘winter disease’116   because even short-term epidemics clearly exhibited an annual peak 
in January. An analysis by Sir Leonard Rogers (1868 – 1962) of the mild type of smallpox in 
England and Wales from 1921 to 1927 showed peak seasonal prevalence, closely related to low 
absolute humidity and lower temperatures.117 Peak prevalence in Boston in 1901 was in January, and 
in Liverpool covered the months January to March in 1903. A similar monthly pattern was observed 
in Glasgow and London (Figure 8), although the possible seasonal pattern remains unexplained for 
this period.  
 
      The smallpox register for Liverpool queried whether two cases had occurred from contact with 
foreign mail. 118   Sir William Osler (1849-1919), a young Canadian physician in 1876, had 
disinfected his letters when he had smallpox, 119 and in his popular 1892 general textbook of 
medicine he supported the fomite transmission theory. The British Medical Journal in 1901 reported 
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smallpox transmission to Nottingham by Mormon mail from Salt Lake City, 120 where it was 
unlawful to compel vaccination.121 Transatlantic steamers were the only means of mail transportation 
from North America but there is no evidence of disinfection procedures involving mail.  
  
      A major concern was infection of communities living in proximity to isolation hospitals, 
including the New Ferry Hospital. Confusion over aerial transmission, and in particular, 
controversy over spread of disease from hospitals was a major concern, 122 and was a reason the 
Liverpool outbreak was studied in great detail.123 This issue was investigated by Dr Richard J. Reece 
and reported in a memorandum to the Liverpool Medical Officer of Health in 1905.124 Following 
detailed statistical analysis he concluded that smallpox risk was disproportionately high in areas 
nearer to the hospital during periods in which it was receiving acute smallpox cases. This conclusion 
was queried by Dr Edward William Hope (1856-1951), the Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool, 
who listed ten points of contention, noting that high numbers of cases also occurred around hospitals 
not receiving smallpox cases, and for one hospital, cases occurred before the receiving hospital was 
opened.125 Although disputed, 126  Reece defended his conclusions, considering that aerial convection 
probably operated in the case of each Liverpool hospital.127, 128 Sixty years after these exchanges, 
community concerns about neighbourhood smallpox transmission in the vicinity of the Port Sanitary 
Hospital at New Ferry were still being voiced following incidence of residential infections within a 
quarter mile radius of the hospital.129 - 132 This concern was also expressed by the Chief Public Health  
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Inspector at the time, who implicated fly transmission.133 An airborne outbreak of smallpox in a 
German hospital was reported in 1970, which demonstrated the local features believed to be of 
importance in this unusual pattern of transmission.134 
 
      Modern understanding has improved knowledge of infection risk, although the minimum 
infectious dose of smallpox remains unknown, ie how many virus particles an individual needs to 
inhale to become infected. 135 The probability of airborne tiny particles (less than a thousandth of a 
millimetre in size) from surfaces seems low because the smaller the particle the more avidly it 
adheres, reducing the risk of fomite transmission.136 This issue was re- assessed as late as 1978 during 
the legal case surrounding the last case of smallpox in the United Kingdom, when long distance 
airborne spread of smallpox from a laboratory was dismissed as improbable.137 A recent meta-
analysis calculated that when index cases were quickly identified and control established early, the 
reproduction rate to secondary generations was low, which is consistent with limited aerial 
transmission. When index cases remained unidentified a large increase in the median initial 
reproduction rate occurred.138, 139 In the Liverpool epidemic a crude upper estimate of the  
reproduction rate (defined as the expected number of new infected hosts that an infectious host  
will produce in a large randomly mixed population of susceptible individuals), was up to twenty, 
based on index and secondary cases, suggesting late case recognition with a high reproduction rate.140 
This rate may be overestimated as contact status was not always available and tertiary or later 
generation cases may have been included. There may be an interval of two to three weeks between 
each generation of cases and even during the transmission season an index case rarely infected as 
many as five persons.141 Failure to instigate effective case isolation and contact tracing would have 
prolonged the Liverpool epidemic. 
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Vaccine efficacy and uptake 
      Table III compares case fatalities in several cities in relation to vaccination status. Vaccine 
efficacy is estimated for each site. Vaccine efficacy in this context is the percentage reduction in case 
fatality in the vaccinated compared to the unvaccinated group. Such estimates were not reported at 
the time of the United States and United Kingdom outbreaks as an accepted formula for its 
calculation had not yet been proposed. Statistical methods to evaluate how likely it is that any 
observed difference between the groups arose by chance were first proposed in 1900 by Karl Pearson 
(1857-1936), founder of the modern field of statistics, using the chi square test.142 It was not until 
1915 that epidemiologists derived measures related to efficacy.143 Publications and reports on 
smallpox epidemics in the early twentieth century provided only descriptive statistics with listings of 
cases and deaths. 144-146  
 
       From the estimates of vaccine efficacy in Table III, it can be concluded that it was considerably 
lower in Boston than Liverpool, reflected in the higher death rate of vaccinated cases in Boston. 
Mortality in unvaccinated cases was similar in both cities. Vaccine efficacy estimates for the London 
and Glasgow outbreaks were much higher than that for Boston. The proportion of the hospitalised 
population vaccinated in Boston was only twenty seven per cent, which was less than half that for the 
United Kingdom cities. Vaccine uptake in the United States was irregular, 147 and by the 1930s four 
states still had laws prohibiting compulsory vaccination, twenty-nine had no vaccine laws, six 
provided for a local option and four had made it compulsory.148  In Boston, State law by 1855 
required that children be vaccinated to enter public school but adult vaccination was voluntary. Yet 
enforcement was problematic and in 1902 there was uncertainty on how many people were 
vaccinated in Boston as no state or federal agency compiled data. In England infant vaccination had 
been compulsory since 1853, with substantial penalties for non-compliance in 1902.149 In 1898 an 
amendment to the Public Health Act allowed conscientious objection, although early in the twentieth 
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century less than 200,000 exemptions were granted, equivalent to about twenty-five per cent of all 
births.150 In 1901 coverage of infants in England due to be vaccinated was approximately seventy-
eight per cent.151   
 
      In both countries community wide vaccination and re-vaccination campaigns were started during 
the epidemics. In Boston uptake was impaired by the unpopularity of the vaccine, side effects 
seemingly a greater problem than mild smallpox.152 Massachusetts vaccination law also penalised 
vaccination refusal with a five dollar fine. In January 1902 legislation was proposed by anti-
vaccination supporters, including some physicians, to repeal state compulsory vaccination laws.153 
The anti-vaccination campaign undermined public acceptance of Health Department authority as it 
disputed the utility of vaccination on medical grounds as well as based on restriction of civil liberties. 
The well recognised Boston physicians, Dr Caroline Eliza Hastings (1841-1922) and Dr Sarah 
Newcomb Merrick (b.1844), sparred with Dr Durgin, the Chair of Public Health, disputing the merits 
and safety of the vaccine. 154 This debate captured the ideological interface between 
antivaccinationists and public health. A focal point was the British Anti-vaccination League, which 
had strong links to New England.155 In 1905 the United States Supreme Court eventually upheld the 
right that states could mandate compulsory vaccine laws under their police powers.156 The story of 
these judicial proceedings highlights the critical role for medical authorities to gain public trust from 
a diverse audience in ensuring the success of a public health campaign. In England public concern 
about vaccination led to the introduction of the conscience clause in the new vaccination act.157 In 
Boston intermittent vaccine availability from private and public sources, doubts about the efficacy of 
vaccine lymph,  concerns about complications, including documented contaminated vaccine 
transmission of syphilis and tetanus, compounded public anxiety such that public confidence 
plummeted.158 There were staggered introductions of vaccinations programmes, with closures and re- 
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opening of vaccine stations in Boston and Cambridge.159 It is likely these factors contributed to the 
length of the post peak epidemic period that occurred in Boston.    
     In Liverpool widespread smallpox vaccination was prioritised and the benefits of vaccination were 
strongly promoted locally.160 The question of effectiveness arose due to cases occurring in known 
vaccinees, and it was understood that primary vaccination alone would not prevent severe 
epidemics.161 Some individuals used the conscientious objection clause in the 1898 Public Health Act 
to refuse vaccination. During the epidemic, the Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool supported an 
initiative to repeal this clause,162 stating that 460,000 people remained susceptible out of a population 
of 750,000 (sixty-one per cent).163   This is lower than the estimate in Table III, derived from hospital 
data. With coverage thus reduced, medical officers had also to rely on public health surveillance and 
containment, with selective vaccination of contacts.164  
 
      The reasons for higher vaccine efficacy in Liverpool compared to Boston are unknown. This may 
relate to vaccine potency or storage conditions, differing pre-epidemic population immunity, or herd 
immunity, 165 and/or strain variations in smallpox virus.166 Boston and Liverpool authorities produced 
different vaccines derived from varying strains. Badcock’s lymph was generally used in England, 167 
and Mulford’s pure lymph vaccine in the East coast United States.168 Bacterial contamination became 
a problem in the United States in 1901-1902 when the demand for vaccine was great, perhaps 
indicating haste in production.169 Vaccine production was poorly regulated, with competition 
between several private firms. In 1895, Walter Reed (1851-1902), the eminent United States army 
pathologist and bacteriologist, had presented a paper to the District of Colombia Medical Society 
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titled ‘What credence should be given to the statements of those who claim to furnish vaccine free of 
bacteria’.170 His answer, after examining vaccine needle points, was ‘none at all’.171 By early 1902 
the medical profession realised that national licensing was required as it was contradictory to require 
compulsory vaccination without product safety. An Act of Congress was signed by President 
Theodore Roosevelt on 1 July, 1902 requiring manufacturers to comply with production standards, 
after which four firms went out of business.172 
   
      Vaccine virus deteriorates if not cooled in transit, and transport in baggage cars in the United 
States had to avoid proximity to steam coils which affected vaccine quality.173 In Liverpool, Dr 
William Hanna, assistant Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool, noted that below freezing  
temperatures could easily be obtained on board most larger sea vessels, and a suitable supply of 
efficient lymph (ie vaccine) could be stored for months and be ready in an emergency.174 Lack of 
available vaccine aboard oceanic vessels remained an important limitation. 
 
             In theory vaccination not only diminishes the susceptibility of vaccinated individuals, but also 
reduces the degree and duration of infectiousness.175 In Liverpool only a few vaccinated children less 
than five years of age developed smallpox, indicating protection following infant vaccination that 
lasted longer than five years.176 An assessment of vaccination during the Liverpool epidemic was 
presented almost a decade later by Dr Hanna in a book entitled ‘Studies in Smallpox and 
Vaccination’.177 Post exposure vaccination of contacts early in the incubation period was 
recommended. This strategy of selective ring vaccination of contacts living proximate to cases which 
was used in Liverpool was adopted during the World Health Organisation smallpox eradication 
campaign of the 1970s. Despite challenges by the Anti-vaccination League.178 Liverpool remained 
one of the best vaccinated cities in the country.179   
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Press responses 
      Two Liverpool city newspapers printed regular press communications, with occasional notices in 
the local Wirral Birkenhead press, which covered the New Ferry Sanitary Hospital area. The press 
was responsible for reporting accurately the local position. Detailed summaries of medical 
presentations by Dr Edward Hope, held at The Liverpool Medical Institute, were printed for public 
consumption, and included conclusions of local City Council meetings.180   Newspapers promoted 
vaccination and emphasised epidemic surveillance by reporting case numbers, which must have 
reassured the general public. It was less alarming to attribute new cases to maritime sources than to 
discover a local source of contamination.181 Local opposition remained and prominent individuals 
opposed to vaccination published their views in the national press, including George Bernard Shaw 
(1856-1950).182  Spurious claims appeared in The Liverpool Echo for use of alternative remedies,  
such as a ‘curative syrup’ (Mother Seigels) in times of epidemic, that would keep the whole body 
strong, avoiding enfeeblement by indigestion, anaemia, blood disorders and lack of stamina 
necessary to resist contagion.183 A qualification noted ‘Mother Siegel’s Syrup does not cure 
smallpox, but will purify the blood, build up the system and give increased strength to resist 
contagion and disease’.  
 
      Multiple press news releases appeared in the Boston Globe and Cambridge Chronicle as the 
outbreak developed. The Globe reported in December 1901 that the outbreak had abated, was at no 
time serious, and that the public seemed to have been needlessly alarmed with largely imaginary 
dangers.184 Disputes on conflicting medical advice were published, and prosecutions for refusing 
vaccination, as well as the official advice of the Massachusetts Anti-compulsory Vaccination Society, 
185 together with illustrations of the public campaign to promote vaccine uptake.186 As in Liverpool, 
advertisements encouraged people to seek protection from other means, including ‘Radam’s microbe 
killer’ that prevented and cured every contagious disease,187 and Lifebuoy Soap that prevented 
smallpox.188 Howard’s Health Company cures were advertised in a journal started in November 1901 
by the anti-vaccination campaigner Dr Immanuel Pfeiffer of Boston,189 who became infamous in 
February 1902 when, unvaccinated,  he contracted smallpox  after visiting Boston’s smallpox 
hospital on a dare from Dr Durgin, Boston’s Board of Health Director.190 
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The demise of smallpox 
      The data presented above support the view that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
smallpox had become a disease primarily introduced to the north of England from abroad by 
merchant seamen or by travellers. Sometimes the disease was detected on board ship, but inadequate 
public health measures lead to occurrence of many missed cases. Between 1904 and 1916 only 144 
further cases (six deaths) occurred in the United Kingdom, dwindling to two cases in the last three 
years.191 National smallpox control was effectively achieved in the succeeding decade. In England 
and Wales between 1935 and 1952 smallpox was imported on thirty-one occasions, spreading to the 
population twenty-five times.192 Maritime transmission to Liverpool occurred sporadically after 1903 
and the last recorded smallpox case at the New Ferry Sanitary Hospital was a child disembarked from 
the SS Cilicia in April 1950, a P & O steamer mostly engaged in the India run.193 In Europe between 
1950 and 1971 acquisition of Variola minor from infected ship crews or officials occurred in five per 
cent of all reported cases (31/652) during that period.194 The danger of introduction of ship-borne 
smallpox into the United Kingdom was emphasised by McGregor in 1942 who still stressed 
everything should be done to protect passengers and crew, and so minimize the risk to Britain.195 Yet 
in the twentieth-century a valid vaccination certificate was not required for travellers to the UK by 
sea from India, Pakistan, Burma, or Nigeria, or countries important as virus reservoirs. The emphasis 
switched to diagnosis by ships’ doctors and immediate vaccination of contacts on board became the 
normal procedure. It was hoped that late vaccination would protect contacts, identify them as 
exposed, and allow arising cases of smallpox to be quickly recognised.196 Marsden emphasised 
quarantine of ships, as practised in other countries, following incidents on the SS Tuscania in 
Glasgow in 1929, and SS Cathay in the Port of London in 1938.197 Dixon illustrated this with the 
example of the SS Mooltan, when contacts were quarantined for only four to five days and were then 
allowed free travel, leading to an outbreak which required an immense public health control effort.198 
Longer ship quarantine periods would have greatly reduced this risk to the local population, but was 
not required by law. In almost the last outbreak in the UK in 1962, an initial haematological 
diagnosis of P.vivax malaria in a child whose subsequent death was attributed to staphylococcal 
septicaemia, was later realised to be smallpox.199 The pathologist, who completed the post-mortem, 
was unvaccinated and subsequently died of confluent smallpox. In the United States Variola minor 
became the dominant form. In 1906, so far as can be learned from the United States Public Health  
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Department’s records, severe smallpox cases were scarce, occurring in only nine of 12,503 reported 
cases.200 During the 1920s nearly 400,000 cases were reported with very low case fatality, and during 
the next decade few American states mandated vaccination and in 1971 routine childhood 
vaccination was discontinued. 201 
 
                                                                 Conclusions 
      Smallpox was regularly transmitted across the Atlantic after its arrival from tropical Africa in the 
fifteenth century.202 Many other diseases failed to make the transfer for lack of suitable vectors.203 
With the advent of rapid transatlantic steamers after 1860 American-United Kingdom transmission 
was guaranteed. Common factors across the cities of Boston and Liverpool, and late recognition of 
new infections in persons incubating the disease facilitated the occurrence of large epidemics of 
smallpox in these two cities. Transatlantic passage of infection corresponded temporally with the 
period of peak national incidence in the United States. This high infection risk was most likely 
channelled by maritime passage to Liverpool in 1901. Despite communications in 1901 between staff 
at the Liverpool Port Authority and the United States Public Health Service, there is no record of 
heightened maritime surveillance in either city or country. 
 
      Dr Edward William Hope, the Liverpool Medical Officer of Health during the epidemic, was 
essentially the counterpart of Dr Samuel Holmes Durgin, Head of the Public Health Department in 
Boston, who was considered one of the greatest public health physicians in nineteenth century 
America.204 Both steered development of effective control measures, through surveillance and 
screening, isolation, quarantine, contact tracing and selective vaccination around cases, now known 
as ring vaccination. Both contended with anti-vaccinationists which were especially vehement in 
Boston. The public health principles they implemented were later used by the global smallpox 
eradication programme.205 Post exposure smallpox vaccination can be critical in limiting 
transmission, and historical analysis of the Liverpool data suggests long-lasting protective effects of 
smallpox vaccination.206 This approach, adopted in Liverpool by the Port Authority with maritime 
cases, helps explain the city’s success in its early control of the epidemic and the very rapid fall in 
incidence in 1903. Dr Hope’s work established Liverpool as an international public health authority, 
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pre-dating the wider global effort to eradicate smallpox. 207 This contrasts with the much more 
gradual fall in incidence in Boston over several months where vaccine coverage and efficacy was 
much lower. Later probable transmission beyond Liverpool led to wide urban dispersion in northern 
cities and towns between 1902 and 1904. After 1905 control activities in the United Kingdom 
effectively reduced cases to minimal numbers 208, whereas in the United States epidemics continued 
up until the late 1920s, when the country had the highest number of cases of any in the world except 
for India.209 The United States was the least vaccinated country for smallpox of any in the world.210   
  
     The maritime origins of infection transported by record-breaking transatlantic liners of that time 
reflects the influence of commercial shipping interests requiring rapid turn-around times. The 
reluctance to implement strict quarantine, perhaps especially in Boston, was partly dictated by cost 
and commercial considerations. There is much to suggest that the Liverpool smallpox epidemic 
originated in Boston, but this is perhaps less important than other conclusions.  The inter-change is a 
reminder of the greatly magnified risks with modern air transport of unrecognised infections 
combined with a high priority for commercial efficiency. This historical event is an unusual example 
of special ties forged between the United States and the United Kingdom through disease 
transmission rather than diplomacy. 
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Table I Number of maritime cases of smallpox landed from vessels in Port of Liverpool 1900    
1904 in relation to United States origin and case fatality  
    Sources: Annual Reports on the Health of the City of Liverpool during 1900 to 1904; Liverpool Smallpox Register, 
Wirral Archives, [reference notes 30, 93] 
 
 
 a    Percentage of Boston and East coast United States transits  of all Liverpool maritime cases for that year 
 b    Annual number of cases for the city of Liverpool 
 c    Single case landed at Queenstown, Ireland  
 d    Includes nineteen cases on ship from Boston via the Mediterranean; one case on ship from New York 
 e    Transported on two different ships 
      f     Transported on seven different ships  
 g     Four cases from New York. Sixteen different ships brought cases, or suspected cases, of    smallpox 
 h     Four cases from Baltimore 
 
 
 
Year Cases from ships 
arriving from Boston 
n (%) a 
Cases from ships arriving 
from other locations 
n (%) 
Annual 
case total b 
n (%) 
Annual 
case fatality 
n (%) 
1900             1  (3.7) c 26 d 156       23  (14.7) 
1901 5  (21.7) e                       18 37         6  (16.2) 
1902           20  (44.4) f                       25 560       20  (3.6) 
1903             4  (16.6) g                       20  1720      141 (8.2) 
1904             4  (66.6) h                         2  27     2 (7.4) 
Total           34  (27.2)                       91 2500      192 (7.7) 
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          Table II United Kingdom smallpox period incidence and case fatality 1900-1905  
                         Sources: McVail, Table II, 6 [note 49]; Martin, Table II, 19 [Journal of Hygiene, 34,1(1934)]; UK Census, 1901 [note 39]                                                                                                                
 Location Period in 
years a 
Cases 1901 Census 
population 
Period incidence 
per 105 
Deaths Case fatality 
(%) 
Lancashire & North-West England 
Liverpool 1901-03 2280 684958 333                       160 7.0 
Stockport 1902-04 159 78897 201                       15 9.4 
Oldham 1902-03 413 137246 301                       32 7.7 
Chadderton 1902-05 144 24000 600                       5 3.5 
Wigan 1902-03 70 60764 115                       1 1.4 
Blackburn 1902-03 141 127626 110                       5 3.5 
Salford 1902-04 262 220957 119                       12 4.6 
Manchester 1902-04 563 543872 103                       33 5.9 
Warrington 1903 86 64242 134                       4 4.7 
Macclesfield 1903-04 69 37500 184                       5 7.2 
Preston 1904-05 172 112989 152                       8 4.7 
Bradford 1901 28 279767 10                       0 0.0 
St Helens 1902-05 66 84410 78                       3 4.5 
ALL 1901-05 4453 2457228 181 283 6.3 
Yorkshire & Pennines 
Ossett Union 1902-03 519 12903 4022                    61 11.8 
Heckmondwike 1904 91 9500 958                      5 5.5 
Dewsbury 1904 552 28060 1967                    57 10.3 
Leeds 1902-05 690 428968 161                      35 5.1 
Halifax 1903 141 104936 134                      6 4.3 
York 1902-04 39 77914 50                    7 17.9 
Batley 1904 103 128712 80                      6 5.8 
ALL 1902-05 2135 790993 270 172 8.0 
Central England 
Leicester 1902-04 731 211579 345                      30 4.1 
Derby 1903-04 255 105912 241                      5 2.0 
Nottingham 1903-05 479 239743 200                     17 3.5 
Sheffield 1902-04 141 380793 37                      5 3.5 
Northampton 1902-03 44 87021 51                    9 20.5 
Birmingham 1902-05 364 522204 70                      17 4.7 
ALL 1902-05 2014 1547252 130 83 4.1 
North-East England 
Tynemouth 1902-05 328 51366 639                      17 5.2 
South Shields 1902-05 272 97263 280                      14 5.1 
Chester-le-Street 1903-04 106 34000 312                      6 5.7 
Newcastle 1903-05 628 215328 294                      28 4.5 
Durham 1902 35 419782 8                      1 2.9 
Sunderland 1902-03 66 146077 45                      4 6.1 
Hull 1903-04 141 240259 77                      8 5.4 
ALL 1902-05 1576 1204075 131 78 4.9 
South Wales and South-West England 
Swansea 1902 187 94537 198                     187 17.1 
Cardiff 1901-05 96 164333 58                       5 5.2 
Portsmouth 1902-05 20 188133 11                       1 5.0 
Bristol 1903-05 125 328945 38                       1 3.2 
ALL 1902-05 428 479948 89 39 9.1 
London 
Greater London 1901-2 9484 6226494 152 (203) 
b 1540 16.2 
Scotland and Ireland 
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Glasgow 1900-04 3413
 c 762000 448 371 10.9 
Edinburgh 1900-04 191 303638 63 16 8.4 
Dundee 1903-04 175 154734 113 12 6.9 
Rest of Scotland 1900-04 2844 3251731 87 235 8.3 
Dublin (hospital) 1903-04 243        448000 54 33 13.6 
             a: Annual periods may not include all months of the year dependent on month outbreak commenced or resolved. 
             b: Brackets is incidence estimate based on inner city London population alone.  
             c:  Includes some cases from beyond city boundaries. 
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34 
 
City 
 
Allegedly 
unvaccinated 
Admittedly 
vaccinated 
          Total Vaccine efficacy % 
(95% confidence interval) a 
% cases 
vaccinated 
% population protected 
  (95% confidence interval) b 
 Cases  Deaths  % Cases Deaths  % Cases  Deaths  %    
Liverpool c 
Fazakerley Hospital 
Park Hill Hospital 
 
119      27    22.7 
277      65    23.5 
 
571      15      2.6 
1063     35      3.3 
 
  690      42     6.1 
1340    100     7.5 
 
90.8 (82.1-95.3) 
88.9 (82.8-92.8) 
 
82.7 
79.3 
 
       75.1 (67.9-78.8) 
       70.5 (65.7-73.6) 
London d 194      98    50.5 760     108    14.2    954    206    21.6 83.8 (77.0-88.5) 79.7        57.1 (48.9-63.4) 
Glasgow e 122      63    51.6 1642     150     9.1 1764     213   12.8 90.6 (86.1-93.6) 93.1        84.3 (80.2-87.1) 
Boston f    842    188    22.3 754       82    10.9 1596     270   16.9 57.6 (43.8- 67.9) 47.2        27.2 (25.2-32.0) 
 
     a   Percentage reduction in case fatality in the vaccinated compared to unvaccinated group. Estimated from: attack rate unvaccinated minus attack rate vaccinated divided by  
          attack rate vaccinated x 100.  An alternative equivalent formulation of vaccine efficacy is [1 minus relative risk] x 100, where relative risk is risk of developing the disease  
          (or case fatality in this table) for vaccinated compared to unvaccinated people. 
  b   Calculated from [vaccine efficacy  x  percentage cases vaccinated], on assumption percentage cases vaccinated is indicative of population vaccine coverage. 
  c   Source: Edward W. Hope. Annual Report on the Health of the City of Liverpool in 1903. C.Tinling and Co., Printing Contractors, Liverpool, 1904, p 35, p 39 [note 
73].  
  d   Source: The Jenner Society. The London Epidemic of Smallpox. London, 1901, p. 1. Analysis of epidemic data for London for 1901. 
  e   Source: John C. McVail. Smallpox in Glasgow, 1900-1902. British Medical Journal, 1902:40-43. Total cases mostly excludes children under five years. 
  f    Source: M.R. Albert, K.G. Ostheimer, J.G. Breman. The last smallpox epidemic in Boston and the vaccination controversy, 1901 -1903. New England Journal of 
Medicine, 344, 5, (2001), 375-378, [note53]. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1   Liverpool Port Sanitary Hospital Commemorative plaque 
 
Figure 2   United States smallpox incidence per 100,000 population per annum, 28th June 1901 -27th July 1902 
Sources: National Population Census data of 1900, [note 47]; Annual Report of state smallpox notifications of the Surgeon General of the Public Health and 
Marine-Hospital Service for 1901 [note 48]. 
 
Figure 3   Neighbourhood smallpox transmission linked to imported maritime cases from Boston 
Sources: Port Sanitary Hospital Archives [note 30]; Annual Report on Health of the City of Liverpool during 1902 [note 73].  
 
Figure 4   Commercial Map showing the transatlantic trade connections of the Port of Liverpool in 1903.  
Source: Appendix, City of Liverpool. Handbook compiled for the Congress of the Royal Institute of Public Health., edited by E.W.Hope (Liverpool, Lee and 
Nightingale, Printers, 1903). Map production Spottiswoode and Co., Ltd., Liverpool. Commercially developed: red British Empire; Grey: other countries. 
Detail of transatlantic section from a world map. 
 
Figure 5   Periodicity of Boston and Liverpool epidemics and dates of transatlantic ship sailings 
Sources: [reference notes, 43, 50, 53, 68, 69].   
 
  Figure 6   Periodicity of London and Liverpool smallpox epidemics between 1875 and 1905 
  Sources: [reference notes, 27, 63, 93]. 
  
Figure 7   United Kingdom spatial smallpox period incidence per 105 population 1900 -1905  
Sources: McVail, Table II, 6 [note 49]; United Kingdom National Census, 1901 [note 99].    
 
Figure 8    Comparative smallpox incidence 1900 -1903 per 100,000 population for Liverpool, Glasgow, London, New York, and Boston 
Sources: [reference notes 3, 53, 66, 93]; W. J. Martin, The epidemic curve of smallpox, Journal of Hygiene (London), 34, 1 (1934), Table II, page19; United 
States National Census 1900 [note 47]; United Kingdom National Census 1901, [note 99] 
